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This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In
the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected
of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium
prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, in particular
on partial lying, where some agents dishonestly report a non payo -maximizing report. I
discuss the relationship with previous theoretical models of lying that conceptualize the im-
age concern as an aversion to being suspected of lying. The second half of the paper tests the
theoretical predictions in an experiment. In contrast to previous literature, the experimen-
tal results show no evidence that image concerns influence lying behavior in the laboratory.
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1 Introduction
The virtue ethics of the ancient Greeks recognize honesty among the desirable moral character-
istics which can lead individuals to flourish and to live a “good life”.1 In contemporary popular
science, intellectuals stress the value of honesty.2 Virtues also play a role in economic situa-
tions; if Alice is a buyer and Bob is a seller in a credence good market, it will be relevant for
Alice not just to ask if Bob was honest with her in the exchange they just had, but whether Bob
will be honest again in future exchanges. To form this latter expectation, Alice needs to have
an idea about Bob’s moral character, in particular about his honesty. This paper is concerned
with the strategic implications when individuals want to appear honest.
In strategic situations where some agents are better informed than others, truthful com-
munication can be di cult or impossible. This impedes information transmission and can lead
to market failures (Akerlof, 1970, Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Some of these ine ciencies can
be overcome if lying is costly for agents (Kartik, 2009), but the size and form of lying costs is
mainly an empirical question.
More recently, a literature has emerged that empirically investigates lying costs in labo-
ratory experiments. In an experiment, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)–or F&FH–gave
participants a six-sided die. Participants were instructed to roll the die in private and report
the number they rolled to the experimenter. Upon reporting, participants received a payo  in
Swiss Franks that corresponded to their die roll, with the exception of the number six, which
paid nothing. Since the objective distribution of the die roll is known, lying behavior can be
inferred from the aggregate report distribution. F&FH find that the empirical distribution of
reports is consistent with some participants reporting honestly and other participants lying.
In various follow-up experiments–that sometimes let participants flip coins instead of rolling
a die–similar patterns emerge (Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond, 2019).
One robust feature in experiments that use the F&FH die-roll task is that some individ-
uals lie and dishonestly report a four when they could have earned more money by lying and
reporting a five. One reason for the observed behavior could be that individuals dislike being
suspected of lying; since fewer individuals lie to report a number that does not maximize their
monetary payo , reporting a lower number evokes less suspicion. Papers by Dufwenberg and
Dufwenberg (2018), Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel (2018) and Khalmetski and Sliwka (2019)
provide theoretical models that formalize this intuition.3 In doing so, they all have to come to
terms with the fact that lying decisions depend on perceived suspicion which in turn depends
on lying decisions. Suspicion therefore is an equilibrium outcome of a game between an agent
1See e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia article on Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2018).
2For example, in Jordan Peterson’s book “12 Rules for Life” (Peterson, 2018), which enjoyed considerable media
attention and commercial success, one rule is “Tell the truth – or, at least, don’t lie”. Another example is that of
Adam Grant, a psychologist and author who, on Sep. 7 2019 sent out the following tweet to his twitter followers,
which gathered more than 900 retweets and 2800 likes: “When you face a choice between being polite and being
honest, err on the side of the truth. It’s better to be disliked but respected than to be liked but disrespected. In the
long run, the people we trust the most are those who have the courage to be sincere. #SaturdayThoughts” (Grant,
2019)
3From now on in the text I will refer to them as D&D, GK&S, and K&S respectively.
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and an observer, in which an agent draws a state (a number on a die, a coin flip) and makes a
report to an observer. The report serves as a signal to the observer, who in turn forms a belief
about the likelihood that the agent lied; a measure of suspicion. The agent’s utility is belief-
dependent, as it depends on the image that the observer attaches to the agent after hearing
their report. In their meta-study, Abeler et al. (2019)–from now on AN&R–conclude that such
image concerns are key to explain the stylized empirical facts observed in experiments on lying.
While image concerns are deemed to be important, there are di erent ways to conceptualize
them. AN&R find that two kinds of image concerns can explain the observed empirical regu-
larities in lying games. The first is an image concern that (in various forms) is used in models
by D&D, GK&S and K&S, where individuals want to signal that they did not lie.4 The second
is a lying model where the signaling motive is similar to the prosocial image model of Bénabou
and Tirole (2006)–hereafter B&T. In this model, individuals want to appear as someone who
is intrinsically honest. The main di erence between both approaches is that in the former in-
dividuals want to signal a good deed (they did not lie), whereas in the latter model individuals
want to signal a moral character (they are intrinsically honest). In this paper I ask if this sec-
ond approach to image concerns can provide useful insights and extend our understanding of
lying behavior. I derive a lying model based on B&T, which so far has only received cursory
attention in the literature.5
I study the strategic implications of individuals signaling their moral character in a lying
game. Agents draw a random number (by rolling a die, flipping a coin, etc.) and make a report
to an observer. They are morally concerned and incur a cost if their report does not equal their
draw. Agents di er in the extent to which they are morally concerned; some su er high and
others low costs from lying. Individual types are private, but in equilibrium the agents’ reports
are informative about their type. This happens because worse moral types have lower lying
costs, and are therefore more likely to dishonestly report a high number, than better types. In
the model, credibility and quality of the report influences an agent’s social image. A report
is more credible the more likely it is that it was made truthfully. Moreover, the reputation
attached to a report depends on the moral type, or quality, of the liars reporting it.
To illustrate how reputations form in the model, consider the following example of a pro-
fessor who, at the day of a final exam, receives messages from some of her students that they
are sick and cannot participate in the exam. By university guidelines, sickness is the only ac-
ceptable excuse for not writing the exam. There might however be other reasons that induce a
student to write that they are sick. Specifically, any student might be sick with some probabil-
ity, or, in case they are not sick, they might be in an emergency. Students who are neither sick
4GK&K and K&S introduce the image concern as either the probability to have told the truth, conditional
on the report, or as the probability to have lied, conditional on the report. D&D further interact the conditional
probability to have lied with the perceived size of the lie. For example, in D&D the agent gets a lower image if they
are suspected of reporting a five instead of a one than if they are suspected of reporting a four instead of a three.
5Proposition 7 in AN&R, appendix B, provides some general properties of such a model. Their analysis however
remains too general to complement the insights derived from the deed-based image model. Indeed, the result that
concludes AN&R’s meta-study (Finding 10) cannot distinguish between a model that employs a deed-based image
concern and a model that uses a character-based image concern as both account for exactly the same empirical facts
(“Only the Reputation for Honesty + LC [deed-based image] and the LC-Reputation [character-based image] models
cannot be falsified by our data” (AN&R, p. 1144)).
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nor in an emergency and excuse themselves from the exam are shirking. Professing to be sick
when one is not constitutes a lie. Students su er a fixed cost when lying, which is equal to their
moral type t. Moral types t are distributed according to some preference distribution among
students and have expectation E(t). A student who is shirking or in an emergency will simulate
sickness if the benefits from not writing the exam are higher than the cost of lying, that is, if
their type is lower than some threshold t̂. Since writing the exam is arguably worse when in
an emergency, the critical type threshold t̂emergency is larger than t̂shirking. A student who claims
to be sick after an emergency has an expected type of E(t|t  t̂emergency), which is larger than the
expected type of a student who lies because they are shirking, E(t|t  t̂shirking). A student who
is actually sick has an expected type E(t), because any randomly chosen student is sick with
the same probability. The professor does not observe the real reason of a student who claims
to be sick. Therefore, upon receiving a message from a student, it is optimal for the professor
to form a posterior expectation about the student’s expected moral character by weighing all
di erent potential motives with their empirical frequency;
E(t|message) =P(sick|message)E(t)
+P(emergency|message)E(t|t  t̂emergency)+P(shirking|message)E(t|t  t̂shirking).
The posterior expectation after receiving a message will always be lower than the prior expec-
tation (that is, E(t|message) < E(t)). This is because the professor cannot distinguish between
truthful and untruthful messages – while sickness is not correlated with moral types, the stu-
dents who send an untruthful message pool with students who send a truthful message, and
those who send the untruthful message are of lower expected type. In line with the idea that
individuals want to be perceived of high moral character, a student’s reputation is equal to the
professor’s posterior expectation. Now assume that there is a (potentially pandemic-induced)
increase in the probability that a student is sick at the exam date. All things equal, such an
increase will increase the professor’s posterior expectation. This reflects the credibility e ect –
if more students are actually sick, it is more likely that any student claiming to be so is telling
the truth. Alternatively, consider an increase in the probability that any student faces an emer-
gency at the exam date (which might also be pandemic-induced as they have to care for sick
family members). Such an increase will also increase the professor’s posterior expectation, as,
conditional on not being sick, it is less likely that the student is simply shirking. This reflects
the quality e ect – even though they may still be liars, students with an emergency have a
better reason to lie.
In the die roll game, the character-based model predicts an equilibrium that can include
partial lying. Recall that agents have a financial incentive to overstate their number. There-
fore, if some agents lie to report the highest paying number, this number will on average be
reported by worse moral types. Because agents are image concerned, they might then have an
incentive to leave some money on the table in exchange for a higher image by reporting the
second-highest or an even lower number when they lie. This dynamic generates an equilib-
rium with characteristics that are similar to the deed-based image models of GK&S and K&S;
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agents lie only if they draw a number that is smaller than or equal to some threshold and report
a number that is above the threshold. Under an equilibrium refinement that restricts liars to
play symmetric strategies, this is the unique outcome of the game.
With the quality e ect, the model introduces a signaling motive whose e ect on lying has
not been studied before. Its relevance depends on the opportunity cost of truth-telling. In the
die roll game, individuals who truthfully report a four, for example, have a di erent opportunity
cost of truth-telling than individuals who truthfully report a one. In both cases, individuals
could have lied to report a five. By being truthful, individuals who report a one forego a larger
marginal gain than individuals who report a four. Hence, while both statements are honest,
a report of one sends a higher signal about intrinsic honesty (“quality”) than a report of four.
In consequence, this e ect leads to new predictions about the strategic complementability and
substitutability of lies and about the e ectiveness of norm interventions, which I explore in
the paper. I also ask what further can be learned from assuming that agents not only di er in
their moral character but also in the extent to which they care about their image.
The second half of the paper complements the theoretical analysis with the design and
results from a lab experiment. The experiment implements a lying game in which some par-
ticipants’ reasons to lie are more justified than those of others (having either a low or high
endowment). The first two treatments exogenously vary whether the average liar either has a
worse or a better reason to lie. As lying should be less stigmatized, and thus more attractive,
when liars have better reasons, comparison of reporting behavior between both treatments
gives an indication of the quality e ect. A third treatment exogenously reduces the number
of participants who truthfully report the highest state in each session. Compared to the re-
maining treatments, this variation makes reporting the highest state look more suspicious
and hence less attractive. It should give an indication of the credibility e ect.
Contrary to expectations, the treatment e ects I estimate are very close to zero and thus
provide no evidence that image concerns motivate lying. In order to better understand the null
results, I further investigate the relation between data I collected on beliefs about lying and
behavior. Both reduced-form evidence and structural estimates suggest that, while beliefs and
behavior are correlated, beliefs do not causally a ect behavior. In contrast, behavior in my
experiment seems mainly to be driven by intrinsic motives and lying behavior is responsive to
financial stakes.
The following section presents the model. At the beginning, parts 2.1 and 2.2 discuss the
setup and equilibrium properties. I apply the model to investigate strategic complementarity
and substitutabilty of lies in part 2.3 and provide an extension of the model to heterogenous
image concerns in 2.4. Thereafter, in 3, I relate the character-based approach developed in
this paper to the relevant theoretical literature and discuss experimental evidence on image
concerns and lying. Section 4 presents the experimental design and section 5 the results. The





Game form Consider a game between a continuum of agents and an observer. Each agent
draws a state j 2 {1, ...,K}, which is randomly determined by nature. The agents can be thought
to be participants in an economic experiment who are asked by the experimenter, who is the
observer, to roll a die. In this case, the state would be the outcome of a die roll. An alternative
interpretation of the setup could see agents as students who, at the day of an exam, are either
sick or healthy and either are in an emergency or not. Throughout this section, we will focus on
the first interpretation. In line with the die roll analogy, we make the simplifying assumption
that the state is distributed uniformly on its domain.
After the draw, agents each make a report a 2 K = {1, ...,K} to the observer and receive a
total payo  consisting of direct and image payo s, as described below. The observer is a passive
player with no action whose payo  we do not further specify.
Direct payo s Agents know their state j, and make a report a, which earns them a direct
payo  y(a), where y(a)   y(a   1) = D(a,a   1) > 0. The payo  scheme might reflect the exper-
imenter’s choice of rewards for reporting numbers certain numbers of the die. Alternatively,
the agent-as-student would always earn the highest payo  by claiming to be sick and excusing
themselves from the exam.
Reporting a 6= j, agents incur cost t which is heterogenous across agents. This cost arises
through a purely intrinsic, moral preference for honesty. That indiviudals are heterogeneous
in their preferences for honesty is documented in experiments such as Gibson, Tanner, and
Wagner (2013), Gneezy, Rockenbach, and Serra-Garcia (2013), and Kajackaite and Gneezy
(2017). Gibson et al. (2013) in particular show that the lying cost distribution function consists
of many intermediate types, who begin to lie if the returns to lying are high enough. The
intrinsic preference for honesty reflects that agents feel bad from lying. This cost is unknown
to the observer, who however knows that it is drawn from a distribution F(t) with full support
on (0, t̄] and which is independent of j. t̄ is a large number, to be specified in detail below. The
density function f (t) is log-concave and E(t|t > t̂) is convex for any t̂ 2 (0, t̄].6
I will use “lying cost” and “moral type” interchangeably when discussing t, as this section
considers honesty as the only relevant moral dimension. This is due to the setup of the game,
which reflects laboratory lying games and elements of verbal communication. In these settings,
lying comes at no expense to a third party, which allows us to exclusively focus on honesty.7
Further morality dimensions, such as altruism, might become relevant and interact with hon-
esty in settings where agents cheat someone else, for example stealing (footnote 12 in section
6Log-concavity is a very common assumption in the signaling literature and the mathematical properties of
log-concave distributions are well understood (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, for an overview). Convexity of
E(t|t > t̂) is a more special assumption, but it holds for many commonly used probability distributions, such as the
normal and the uniform distribution. The assumption implies that the individual likelihood to lie is concave in the
reputation of the highest state.
7The setup might further reflect tax reporting, where individual contributions are a negligible part of total tax
earnings.
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2.3 provides further discussion of this point).
Image payo s In addition to being intrinsically honest, agents also value having a reputation
for honesty. There can be instrumental reasons to value such a reputation. An expert might
prefer to appear honest so as to build an enduring relationship with an advisee. A student
who hopes receive a good letter of support from their professor wants to appear sincere to
them. There are also non-instrumental reasons for why an agent might prefer to look honest;
many individuals want to appear moral and one indicator of morality is honesty. This type of
image concern follows B&T and other approaches in psychological game theory that formalize
the idea that individuals want to signal virtues that make them a “good guy” (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, forthcoming): Through their actions, agents tell others something about their
intrinsic preferences, and agents want to look as if they have preferences which are valued by
an observer. To make an inference, the observer forms a belief about the expected moral type of
an agent reporting a, denoted as R a = E(t|a). The image payo  equals the reputation weighted
by a scalar µ > 0,
µR a,
where µ is not too large, so that agents are not disproportionally sensitive to changes in the
image payo .8
Utility Direct and image payo s add up to total payo s, or utility. An agent of type ( j, t) who
reports a earns utility
u( j, t,a) = y(a) 1a6= jt + µR a.
I now make an assumption on the maximum lying cost which is a number t̄ > D(K,1)+µE(t).
The assumption ensures, in line with the empirical evidence provided by AN&R, that there are
agents who never lie, regardless of the state they draw. One immediate consequence of the
assumption is that the observer always puts a positive probability on any state being reported.
This property is helpful when solving for the equilibrium, as described next.
2.2 Equilibrium
The structure of the game makes it a psychological game (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti,
1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009), as final payo s of agents depend on the observer’s
belief about the agents’ moral type. Agents’ strategies s map their type into a distribution over
reports. Denote the probability of an agent of type ( j, t) reporting a by s(a| j, t). In the following,
an agent is a liar if they have a strategy where s(a| j, t)> 0 for some a 6= j, even if also s( j| j, t)> 0.
To put it another way, an agent who does not always tell the truth is a liar. Conversely, an agent
tells the truth i  s( j| j, t) = 1.
The following equilibrium definition invokes the standard conditions of utility maximization
and that agents and the observer correctly apply Bayes’ rule and have a common prior. This
definition follows the previous literature and serves as a useful yardstick to think through
8See also Lemma 1 in appendix A. B&T, in section 3, provide an extensive discussion on how equilibria depend
on assumptions on µ and f (t) in the class of signaling models studied by them. Many of their insights translate to
the setting studied in this paper.
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strategic interdependencies. Since the maximum lying cost is high, every state is reported with
positive probability in equilibrium. This implies that Bayes’ rule can be applied to calculate the
equilibrium reputation of every state, obliterating the need for further equilibrium refinements
to pin-down beliefs that are o  the equilibrium path.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is defined by strategies s(a| j, t), where
• s(a = j| j, t)   0, s(a 6= j| j, t)   0 and ÂKk=1 s(a = k| j, t) = 1 for all j and t.
• s(a| j, t) > 0 if and only if a 2 arg max
a2K
y(a) 1a6= jt + µE(t|a).




0s( j|l, t)t f (t)dt
ÂKl=1
R t̄
0s( j|l, t) f (t)dt
for j 2 K .
2.2.1 Equilibrium properties
The following part contains general observations about the properties of any equilibrium. They
lay the groundwork for the main prediction which follows afterwards.
We start with an incentive constraint. An agent who draws state j will lie if there is a state
k such that
y(k)  t + µR k > y( j)+ µR j. (1)
Since y(K) > y( j) for j < K, there cannot be an equilibrium where all agents tell the truth. In
this case the reputational payo  would not depend on the reported state, and there would be
an agent of type ( j,e), where e > 0 is arbitrarily close to zero, who could gain by reporting K.
Because lying costs are fixed, agents always can make a report a to gain a gross payo  before
lying costs of size
a 2 arg max
a2K
y(a)+ µR a. (2)
These considerations imply the following observation.
Observation 1. In an equilibrium, any state that is reported dishonestly by some agents must
give the same payo  gross of lying costs as specified in (2).
It is useful to define a set
Q =
⇢




that collects all states that are reported dishonestly with positive probability in equilibrium.
A second consequence of the above reasoning is that there can also not be an equilibrium
where someone lies and reports a state j if some agent lies after drawing j. If someone who
draws j lies, this implies that j /2 arg max
a2K
y(a)+ µR a. Therefore, no agent will lie and report j
if s(k| j, t) > 0 for some k 6= j. By the same reasoning, no agent will lie if they draw a state j 2Q ,
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as lying is costly and does not lead to higher payo s.
The following observation summarizes the considerations above.
Observation 2. If s(k| j, t) > 0 for some k 6= j then, (i), s( j|l, t) = 0 for l 6= j and, (ii), s(k|k, t) = 1.
We now investigate the role of the lying cost has in determining an agent’s report. Consider
again the incentive constraint (1) and note that the payo  from lying strictly decreases in the
lying cost. It follows that an agent lies if their lying cost is su ciently low. In particular, for
each state j there will be a threshold lying cost t̂ j and agents ( j, t) will lie if t  t̂ j, where t̂ j > 0 if
j /2 Q and t̂ j = 0 otherwise. Now consider the reputations that are associated with agents who
draw state j. Truth-tellers comprise the upper tail of the preference distribution, while liars
make up the lower tail. Truth-tellers and liars have an expected cost of respectively
M +(t̂ j) ⌘ E(t|t > t̂ j),
M  (t̂ j) ⌘ E(t|t  t̂ j).
The first term is naturally larger than the second, which reflects that liars are stigmatized
while truth-tellers are honored. We collect all cost thresholds t̂ j of each state in a vector t̂ and
define the expected lying cost of liars by
L (t̂) ⌘ Â
j/2Q




Turning to the reputation of reporting a state, observation 2 implies that, if a state is not lied
at, its reputation is equal to the expected type of agents who are above the threshold;
R j = M +(t̂ j) if j /2 Q . (4)
Every state in Q is reported honestly by a fraction 1/K of all agents. In addition, it is also
reported by liars. Define by




0 s( j|k, t) f (t)dt
the probability that a randomly chosen agent reporting j is telling the truth. The reputation
of reporting j then becomes
R j = r jE(t)+(1  r j)
Âk/2Q
R t̂k
0 s( j|k, t)t f (t)dt
Âk/2Q
R t̂k
0 s( j|k, t) f (t)dt
if j 2 Q .
This expression reflects the reputational spillovers of liars. Since the observer cannot be sure
whether any agent reporting j is a liar or not, her best guess is to average the types of those
agents who report j honestly and those who lie, weighted by r j. Pooling with liars spoils the
image of truth-tellers, as they are suspected to be the kind of agent who lies. For liars, pooling
is image-enhancing, as they cannot perfectly be detected.
One consequence of the results above is that some agents always lie to report K, which gives
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the highest direct payo . Intuitively, every state that is only reported by truth-tellers gives an
image payo  above the observer’s prior belief (that is, R j > E(t) if j /2 Q ). On the other hand,
states that are reported by liars reduce the observer’s prior on average. Therefore, there cannot
be an equilibrium where K gives the highest direct payo  and increases the observer’s prior
belief because such a situation makes it too attractive for liars to report K and experience an
increase in the direct and the image payo . By similar arguments, no agent will ever lie to
report 1, the state which pays the lowest direct payo :
Observation 3. In equilibrium, (i) K 2 Q and (ii) 1 /2 Q .
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary, K /2 Q . Then, for all states j 2 Q ,
y( j)+ µR j > y(K)+ µR K , and y(K) > y( j). (5)
This in particular implies that R j > R K for all j 2 Q . From (4) it follows that R K > E(t) and
more generally E(t|report j /2 Q ) > E(t). By the martingale property of beliefs, it then follows
that E(t|report j 2 Q ) < E(t), which requires that R j < E(t) for some j 2 Q .9 Combining the
inequalities, we arrrive at R K > E(t) > R j for some j 2 Q , which is a contradiction to (5).
(ii) Assume the contrary, 1 2 Q . Then, for all states j /2 Q ,
y( j)+ µR j < y(1)+ µR 1, and y(1) < y( j). (6)
This in particular implies that R 1 > R j for all j 2 Q . Since R 1 is a convex combination of the
prior and the reputation of liars, the highest value R 1 can obtain is smaller than max{E(t),max{t̂}}<
E(t|t > max{t̂}). Since R j = E(t|t > max{t̂}) for some j 2 Q , we arrive at a contradiction to (6).
Some agents are always dishonestly reporting K, but is this also the only state that will
be reported dishonestly in equilibrium? The answer to this question is no, if the direct payo 
becomes small relative to the image payo .
Observation 4. Consider the case where K > 2. If the ratio D(K,K 1)µ is su ciently small, then
there is no equilibrium where Q = {K} .
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where Q is a singleton. It then holds that
y(K  1)+ µR K 1 < y(K)+ µR K ,
because every liar must prefer to report K over K  1. We can rearrange this inequality to




9The martingale property states that a Bayesian observer never changes her prior on average. In the present
context, E[E(t|a)] = E(t).
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Since K  1 /2 Q , it follows from (4) that R K 1 > E(t). Furthermore, if Q is a singleton then
R K =
1
1+Â j/2Q F(t̂ j)
E(t)+
Â j/2Q F(t̂ j)
1+Â j/2Q F(t̂ j)
L (t̂) < E(t).
The left-hand side of (7) is strictly positive. Thus, there is a contradiction if D(K,K 1)µ is su -
ciently small.
The intuition behind this result is that, with image concerns, liars trade o  a higher direct
payo  with a lower image payo . Since liars spoil the reputation of the states they report, it
is beneficial for them to spread out and report more than one state to “smooth out” the image
loss over multiple states.
2.2.2 Equilibrium refinement, main prediction
The predictions above can be useful, but they are also relatively unspecific. One reason is
that the equilibrium definition allows for a very rich variety of strategies that liars can play,
some of which that might appear “strange”, or, at least, would require a considerable amount of
coordination among liars. For example, with K = 4, there can be an equilibrium with Q = {2,4},
where some liars from 1 lie up to report 2 and some agents from state 3 lie down and to also
report 2. This equilibrium can be sustained if liars coordinate on quality; that is, the liars
with the highest intrinsic cost report 2 while those with the lowest intrinsic cost report 4. Such
behavior can be seen as problematic. In equilibrium, liars are indi erent between reporting
any of the states in Q and there is no a-priori reason why some liars would prefer to report one
state over another. The degree to which liars have to coordinate to support such an equilibrium
motivates a refinement that restricts agents to symmetric lying strategies, as defined below.10
Definition 2. Agents play symmetric lying strategies if s(k| j, t),s(k| j0, t 0)> 0 ) s(k| j, t) = s(k| j0, t 0)
for any t, t 0 2 (0, t̄], j, j0 /2 Q .
Put di erently, lying strategies are symmetric when the agents’ type ( j, t) determines whether
they report a state in Q or not, but does not determine which state in Q they report. A similar
property (“uniform cheating”) is imposed by D&D to obtain their main result. Symmetrict lying
strategies imply that liars randomize which state to report dishonestly. While there are few
direct tests of mixed lying strategies, evidence from F&FH is seemingy in line with this refine-
ment. They show that participants who participate in a die-roll experiment for a second time,
and who reported the second-highest or highest state in the first experiment, show exactly the
same average behavior in the second experiment. If liars had further conditioned their reports
on some intrinsic attributes, we would expect reports of those who report the highest state to
be systematically di erent from those who report the second-highest state.11
Solving the model under symmetric strategies gives the main result.
10Appendix B gives a numerical example of an asymmetric equilibrium.
11F&FH also show that participants who report lower numbers in the first experiment are more likely than
others to report lower numbers in the second experiment, implying that decisions are to some extent consistent
across both experiments.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium when agents play symmetric lying strategies.
The equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) The report distribution is strictly increasing in j.
(ii) R j is strictly decreasing in j.
(iii) No agent who draws j reports a state k < j.
(iv) Q = { j 2 K | j > k⇤}, where k⇤ 2 K \{K}.
The equilibrium of the game is of the following type: Agents lie only if they draw a state
smaller or equal than some threshold state k⇤. If they lie, they report a state larger than k⇤.
State K is reported by most agents, followed by K   1, and so on. In what follows, I provide a
sketch of the proof and relegate the technical details to appendix A.
With symmetric strategies, the reputation of states j 2 Q becomes a weighted average be-
tween the quality of non-liars and the expected lying cost of liars;
R j = r jE(t)+(1  r j)L (t̂) if j 2 Q . (8)
One immediate consequence of this is that there is no downwards lying (part (iii) of proposition
1). To see that, note that we now have R j < E(t) < R k for all j 2 Q , k /2 Q . Reporting a lower
state than the one one has drawn now would imply both, a lower image and a lower direct
payo , which is inconsistent with utility maximization. Part (iv) of the proposition is a direct
implication of part (iii).
Turning to reputations, it is useful to distinguish between states that are not in Q and
those that are. Among the former, reputations decrease the higher the state because agents
in higher states have lower direct incentives to lie. For example, agents who report 1, despite
having a high incentive to lie, send a higher signal about their intrinsic honesty than agents
who report k⇤. Reputations also intuitively decrease among states in Q , because liars trade o 
direct payo s for image payo s. The lower the direct payo  of a state, the more the liar has to
be compensated with a higher image payo .
Decreasing reputations imply increasing reporting frequencies; among those states that are
not being lied at, there is an inverse relation between the reputation of the state and the propor-
tion of agents who report it. With symmetric lying strategies, the same relation holds among
states that are being lied at, as the reputation of any state is decreasing in the proportion of
liars that are reporting it. Therefore, in the proposition, (i) is a consequence of (ii).
Constructing the equilibrium is seemingly complicated, because it involves a threshold state
k⇤, a vector of threshold costs t̂, and a vector of probabilities r = (rk⇤+1, ...,rK) that each depend
on one another. The key step in the proof is to realize that we can fix the reputation of the
highest state, which is always reported dishonestly in equilibrium, at some level j. We can
then define a function which implicitly defines the cuto  lying cost as a function of j;
T (t̂,j,D(K, j)) ⌘ D(K, j)+ µ[j  E(t|t   t̂)]  t̂ = 0. (9)
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Note: The dashed line represents the 45 degree line.
Since E(t|t   t̂) is monotonly increasing in t̂, there is always a unique cuto  for a given j, which
we denote as t̂(D(K, j),j) (or sometimes also as t̂ j(j) to save notation).
Plugging these functions into (3), the expected lying cost of liars becomes a function of j only;





We can then observe that the equilibrium reputation of the highest state, j⇤, must be between
L (j⇤) and E(t), as the reputation is a weighted average of the expected lying cost of liars and
that of truth-tellers. Possible values of j that are consistent with equilibrium are on the do-
main between the fixed-point where x = L (x ) and E(t), as displayed in figure 1.
The functions t̂ j(j) can be thought of as characterizing the supply of lies, as F(t̂ j(j)) gives







gives the fraction of agents that are willing to lie if the reputation of the highest state is j.
We can similarly rearrange (8) to write rK as a function of j. The indi erence condition
from observation 1 allows us to derive a function r(D(K, j),j) for all remaining states j 2 Q .
The r j(j) functions characterize the demand side. Transforming r j(j) to a likelihood ratio
lr j(j) =
1 r j(j)



























This function returns the proportion of agents who lie, as a function of j. It can be interpreted
as a demand function, as it gives the fraction of liars that are needed to sustain an equilibrium
for a given reputation of the highest state.
Figure 2 illustrates both functions. The upper panel shows the individual threshold func-
tions and the aggregate supply function. An increase in the reputation of the highest state
makes it more attractive for agents to lie, which is why the function slopes upwards. The
lower panel shows the demand side. These functions slope downwards. Intuitively, when j is
low, many liars will report states di erent from K to alleviate reputational losses. But such
behavior requires that a high proportion of agents lies to sustain the indi erence conditions.
Conversely, as j approaches E(t) every liar will report the highest state, which is possible only
if a small proportion of agents lies.
Supply and demand have to coincide in equilibrium, which determines j⇤, which in turn
pins down t̂, r, and k⇤. The regularity conditions imposed on F(t) ensure existence and unique-
ness of j⇤.
Equilibrium behavior is shaped by signaling motives and a number of insights follow:
Reporting in equilibrium The equilibrium predicts a report density that is increasing in
the direct payo . We would obtain the same prediction from a model with only intrinsic lying
costs. The key di erence between both models is however that, when they are image concerned,
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Figure 3. Example equilibrium report distribution compared to the AN&R data
Note: Example equilibrium distribution of reports when lying costs follow a log-normal
distribution where log-costs have mean zero and standard deviation 1.1, for values y(a) 
y(a 1) = 1, and µ = 2.1.
some agents might lie and report a non-payo  maximizing state. For example, the model can
match the empirical findings from die roll games in laboratory experiments quite well. Figure
3 compares the predicted equilibrium distribution for a calibrated version of the model to the
data collected by AN&R. The model comes close to the observed frequency distribution and in
particular can account for partial lying.
Freeriding on reputation Liars report a state di erent from the highest state only if they
get a higher image payo  in return. One necessary condition for this image enhancing e ect
is that every state which does not maximize direct payo s, and which is reported by a liar, is
also reported honestly by some agents. In equilibrium honest agents and liars pool, and liars
free-ride on the honest agents’ reputation.
Image spoiling mechanisms States that are reported dishonestly su er a reputational
penalty because of two factors; credibility and quality. If a state is reported by many liars,
then any single agent reporting that state does not appear to have credibly done so truthfully.
Since liars are of a worse moral type then the average agent, the reputation of a state su ers
when more liars are reporting it. In addition, the reputation of a reported state also depends
on the kind of liars that are reporting it. Liars are of higher reputation if they have a relatively
high lying cost. That is, they only lie if there are substantial utility gains from lying that give
them good reasons to lie. The marginal liar in state j, who is of type t̂ j, always has a higher
reputation than the inframarginal liars, who are of expected type M  (t̂ j). This implies that the
quality of liars is increasing in their amount. In the limit as t̂ j ! t̄, then M  (t̂ j) ! E(t); there is
no stigma associated with liars from state j. This reflects that bad behavior can be normalized
because “everybody is doing it”. If almost all agents are committing the bad deed, then doing
so oneself is no longer a sign of low character, but merely a signal of mediocrity.
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2.3 Actions: strategic substitutes or complements?
Many information nudges that address unethical behavior such as tax evasion rely on norm re-
minders. The main idea is that such reminders, for example about aggregate tax compliance,
might be useful in convincing individuals to also comply with the majority of individuals who
are compliant. Such interventions implicitly assume that individual actions are strategic com-
plements. This part investigates the theoretical determinants of strategic complementarity
and substitutability of lies.
In the model, the credibility of a report decreases in the number of liars while the quality
of the report increases in the number of liars. There is a tension between both e ects. This
tension can lead to tradeo s that a ect whether lies are strategic complements or substitutes.
We will examine these strategic interactions by exogenously shifting the type of the marginal
liar in state j and evaluating its e ect on lying from other states. Other states are a ected
by changes in t̂ j because such changes have an impact on the image payo  from lying. If the
reputation of the highest state increases in response to an increase in t̂ j then agents from other
states will be encouraged to lie. Otherwise, they will be discouraged. Formally, we have the
following definition.




Define S(j, t̂ j) and D(j, t̂ j) as in proposition 1 but where the lying threshold of one state t̂ j is
determined exogeneously. Consider an increase in lying from agents who draw state j, which
results in an increased lying cost threshold from t̂ 0j to t̂ 00j > t̂ 0j. After the increase, the supply of
lies becomes larger – at any given level j more agents are lying (S(j, t̂ 00j )> S(j, t̂ 0j)). This reflects
the mechanical credibility e ect, which makes it more likely that any agent reporting a high
state is a liar. If isolated, this e ect crowds out lying of agents from all other states. In addition,
there is a quality e ect whose sign is not unambiguously determined. If the average liar is of
better quality after the increase, lying becomes more attractive. Everyone then benefits from
the higher reputation that is associated with lying. In this case, the quality e ect goes against
the credibility e ect. There can however also be situations where the quality and credibility
e ects go into the same direction, namely if an increase in t̂ j makes the average liar worse. In
general, an increase in t̂1 will always lead to a positive quality e ect, while an increase in t̂k⇤
makes it more likely that the quality and credibility e ect are both negative. Intuitively, liars
who draw state 1 have the best, and liars who draw k⇤ have the worst reasons to lie. Liars in
k⇤ are relatively cheap; they lie for a smaller utility gain than liars in 1, which makes them the
lowest quality liars on average.12
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) show that norm reminders can be e ective if agents have image
concerns and are uncertain about the distribution of preferences in the population. Through
12The fact that “small” lies are more severely stigmatized than “large” lies would be more ambiguous in a setting
where agents’ lying decisions have direct payo  implications for a third party. In settings where agents cheat at
the expense of others, it would be appropriate to introduce further moral dimensions, such as pro-sociality, into the
model. The consequence might be that a “large” lie is more stigmatized than a “small” lie, because agents who take
from someone else signal that they care little about the welfare of others. (See e.g. Cohn, Maréchal, Tannenbaum,
and Zünd (2019) for further discussion and evidence that individuals are less likely to cheat for a large gain than
for a small gain when they believe that someone else will su er from it.)
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revealing that agents on average are su ciently moral, a planner can increase aggregate moral
behavior in the population. A number of experiments suggest that participants react in con-
formist ways to information about past report distributions (Rauhut, 2013, Diekmann, Przepi-
orka, and Rauhut, 2015), indicating that lies are strategic complements. These e ects are
generally small and have not been confirmed by AN&R, who in one experiment find an in-
significant e ect of shifting beliefs about lying on behavior. From a theoretical perspective,
one interesting aspect in lying games is that the bad deed (lying) cannot be perfectly identi-
fied. This can hamper the e ectiveness of norm reminders and might explain its ambiguous
empirical e ects. Through the lens of character-based image models, norm reminders work
by informing agents that on average, the population is su ciently honest. This increases the
stigma from lying and therefore encourages honesty through the quality e ect. However, infor-
mation that only few agents lie also indicates that reporting the high state will not raise many
suspicions. Therefore, norm reminders might work worse to discourage behavior that is only
imperfectly observed, such as lying.13
2.4 Heterogenous image concerns
This section considers signaling behavior under heterogenous image concerns. We introduce
heterogenous image concerns into the model by assuming that agents can be of two image-
types (unknown to the observer), a high type (h-type) and a low type (l-type). High types care
more about their image than low types. More formally, µq 2 {µl,µh} with µh > µl   0. The
proportion of l-types in the population is r < 1. The lying cost of type q is distributed according
to Fq (t), which is common knowledge. If Fl(t) = Fh(t) preferences are uncorrelated with the
image concern. They can also be correlated. If, for example, Fl(t) > Fh(t) for any t, then agents
who are more image concerned also have higher lying costs. We denote the set of states that
are reported dishonestly by q -agents as Q q .
The following proposition summarizes features of an equilibrium where agents have het-
erogenous image concerns.
Proposition 2. With heterogenous image concerns, K 2Q l. The intersection between Q l and Q h
is either empty or a singleton. When the intersection Q l \Q h is a singleton, Q l \Q h = min(Q h).
Agents with high image concerns always report (weakly) lower states when they lie than
agents with low image concerns. This happens precisely because lower states pay higher image
payo s.
To illustrate the new features that can arise in an equilibrium with heterogenous image
concerns, we will consider two examples of a simple die roll game with only three di erent
payo  levels, where reporting any number lower than five pays one, and reporting five or six
pays five and six, respectively. We also keep heterogeneity in the image concern as simple as
13Indeed it can be shown that, in the current setting with added preference uncertainty, a norm reminder as in
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) is always less e ective in promoting honesty in a lying game compared to an observed
lying game where the observer knows both, draws and reports.
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possible, by assuming that l-type agents are homines oeconomici with µl = 0, who do not incur
a moral cost from lying.14
Example 1. (Separaration by image type) Consider the simple die roll game as described above
with µh = 2 and t ⇠ U [0,8]. If a fraction r = .1 are homines oeconomici, there is an equilibrium
with no downwards lying and where all h-type agents who lie report five.
Proof. We construct the equilibrium above. In any equilibrium l-type agents always report six,
which pays the highest direct payo  (in the examples we slightly abuse notation by naming the















where t̂ is the lying cost threshold function, which is endogeneously determined through
t̂ = D(5,1)+ µ(R 5(t̂) R 1(t̂)).




(t̄(1+ 52 µ) 4D(5,1))2 +16D(5,1)t̄
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, (10)
or, for the parameters above, t̂ ⇡ .9. Finally, we have to verify that h-type agents are indi erent
between reporting 5 and 6, that is if
y(5)+ µR 5 = y(6)+ µR 6. (11)
This holds with equality when r = .1.
There are two takeaways from this example. First, it is possible that liars separate by
image type, that is, agents with the lowest image concern lie to report the highest state and
other agents only lie partially. This is close to a type-based explanation that was suggested by
FFH, where some individuals are full liars, others partial liars, and the rest are truth-tellers.
However, as the example shows the classification into di erent types of liars is endogeneously
determined by the image concern.
A second insight is that any increase in µ, e.g. by making the lying game more observed, in
the setup above would lead to downwards lying. To see this, note that in the equilibrium above,
it is reputationally more attractive to report five than six since the homines oeconomici spoil
the reputation of the highest state. Therefore, any increase in µ would lead to strict inequality
in (11); h-type agents would strictly prefer to report 5 over 6.
Example 2. (Non-modality of the highest state) Consider the simple die roll game as described
above where h-types have µh = 3/2 and draw their lying cost from a discrete distribution (p :
14This approach follows Grossman and van der Weele (2017), who study the impact of introducing the homo
oeconomicus on prosocial behavior in a character-based image model.
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t;(1  p) : t̄), where p = .5 and t̄ = 3.5> t = 3. If r = .21, there is an equilibrium with no downwards
lying and where more agents report five than six.
Proof. The equilibrium described above is consistent with the following reputations;
R 1 = t̄, R 5 =
5pt +(1  p)t̄
1+4p




which imply the incentive constraints
y(5)+ µR 5   t > y(1)+ µR 1 (h-type agents with low lying costs prefer lying to 5 over honestly reporting 1),
y(5)+ µR 5   t̄ < y(1)+ µR 1 (h-type agents with high lying costs prefer honestly reporting 1 over lying to 5),
y(6)+ µR 5 = y(6)+ µR 6 (h-type agents are indi erent between reporting 5 or 6).
By plugging in the parameter values, it can be verified that they indeed hold. In equilibrium,
the fraction of agents reporting six is
(1 r)/6+r ⇡ .34
and the fraction of agents reporting five is
(1 r)/6+(1 r)p⇥ (4/6) ⇡ .40.
Therefore, more agents report five than six.
This example shows that, with heterogenous image concerns, the partial lying motive can
lead more agents to report the second highest state over the highest state. This is a consequence
of the quality signaling motive. Among the di erent quality “segments” of liars, the homines
oeconomici have the worst reputation. Image concerned agents might then be induced to report
a state di erent from the highest state because they do not want to be mistaken for a homo
oeconomicus, even if doing so is more obviously a lie.
There is evidence that the highest state is not always reported by most participants. Out
of 24 papers included in the AN&R meta-study that employ a one-shot die-roll lying game, 8
papers contain experiments where the highest state is not the modal report. Most of these
experiments have been conducted outside of traditional lab environments in settings where
the social distance between observer and participants is arguably lower and where the social
image motive thus might play a greater role. For example, Ru e and Tobol (2017) conduct
an experiment with Israeli soldiers who have to report the outcome of a die roll to an army
o cial. The higher the reported die roll, the earlier the soldiers will be released from duty at
one weekday afternoon. They find that some soldiers lie to the army o cial and that most of
them report the second-highest state.
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3 Related literature
This section provides a discussion of the relation between the model and previous theoretical
work. Thereafter, I consider experimental research on image concerns and lying.
3.1 Relation to other image models
Agents in the model presented in this paper are motivated by ethics of virtue, while agents
in the deed-based models of GK&S and K&S are deontological in the sense that their ethic
follows a rule (“you should not lie”). While signaling motives in the deed-based models are
only about credibility (how suspicious the report is), the character-based model adds a further
quality e ect (what kind of agents are going to lie).
One behavioral di erence that arises is that in deed-based image models, lies are strategic
substitutes: if the fraction of liars increases, any single lie becomes more suspicious, which
discourages individuals from lying through the credibility e ect. In the character-based image
model, lies can become strategic complements if the quality e ect dominates the credibility
e ect.
With character-based signaling, the goal of the observer is to find out the agent’s prefer-
ences. In deed-based models, individual preferences do not interact with the signaling motive.
In the model proposed by AN&R, for example, all agents have the same, commonly known, in-
trinsic lying cost. In such an environment the character-based signaling motive loses its bite.
The observed lying game provides another illustrative special case. In this game, the observer
knows the draw and the report of all agents. With the deed-based approach, lying decisions of
any single agent are not influenced by the strategies of others. With the character-based ap-
proach, agents’ strategies are still interdependent in observed lying games because preferences
remain unobserved.15
AN&R provide a discussion of deed-based signaling under heterogeneous image concerns.
As in the character-based model, downwards lying can arise as part of the equilibrium. As a
consequence, an increase in fraction of agents reporting the highest state does not necessarily
imply that more agents are lying. Instead, the increase might be driven by less agents lying
downwards. An agent who initially underestimates the fraction of agents reporting the high-
est state might therefore become more likely to lie after learning the true fraction, despite lies
being strategic substitutes in the model. Intuitively, the agent believes that they initially over-
estimated the amount of downwards lying, which leads the agent to increase their credibility
belief, which in turn makes reporting the highest state more attractive. As this discussion
highlights, an empirical test which aims to investigate the strategic complementarity and sub-
stitutability of lies by providing individuals with information about reporting frequencies might
only provide ambiguous information, because reporting frequencies might not map one-to-one
into lies.
15As the deed-based approach, the character-based approach would predict that all liars pool on the highest state
in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because partial lies can only be sustained if lying partially provides a higher
image. This is impossible in the observed game with symmetric strategies.
19
D&D consider a setup with no intrinsic lying costs but where image depends on some per-
ceived, increasing lying cost that the observer assigns to judge the intensity of unethical be-
havior. Thus, observers distinguish between more than simply a good deed (truth-telling) and
a bad deed (lying), by interacting actions with the intensive margin of the lie. This could for
example be a realistic assumption if observers dislike the deceptive element of a lie, as a large
lie (reporting a five instead of a one) intends to deceive the observer by more than a small lie
(reporting a four instead of a three). As in the character-based model, incorporating an inten-
sive margin leads to reputations that are strictly smaller the higher the report. The observer’s
motivation is however di erent; in D&D, the primary motivation of the observer is to distin-
guish between acts of lying that might be more or less deceptive, ignoring what the act tells
her about the agent’s character.
3.2 Experimental evidence
A number of experimental tests show that the belief-dependent models provide correct predic-
tions about lying behavior in previously untested environments. In one of their experimental
treatments, GK&S reduce the probability with which participants draw, and therefore truth-
fully can report, the highest state. The theoretical prediction is that more participants will lie
to report a non payo -maximizing state because it is less credible that participants truthfully
report the highest state. The experimental results are in line with this prediction. In sim-
ilar spirit, AN&R find that participants who draw the lower state in a two-state lying game
become less likely to lie when the probability of drawing the high state decreases. Feess and
Kerzenmacher (2018) test a related mechanism. In their experiment, they exogenously vary
the probability with which participants who toss the lower-paying side of a virtual coin can lie
and report the higher-paying side. That is, some participants who toss low can lie while others
can not. They find that a smaller proportion of participants lies if there are more participants
who have the possibility to lie. This is also consistent with the notion that individuals care
about how credible their report is.
In the online appendix to their paper, AN&R present data from an intriguing second exper-
iment on image concerns and lying. In this experiment, participants randomly draw one out
of ten numbers and receive a higher payo  the higher the number they report. The distribu-
tion of the ten states is non-uniform and over two treatments, the authors vary whether the
most likely state is either a seven or a ten, keeping the probability of drawing any of the other
states constant. Figure 4 presents the report distribution observed in the experiment. The
results indicate that participants who draw a number lower than seven become more likely to
lie when probability mass is shifted from seven to ten. Furthermore, participants also tend to
tell larger lies – partial lying is absent from the treatment where drawing a ten is more likely
than drawing a seven.
Interestingly, the credibility and quality channels discussed in this paper might both con-
tribute to the treatment di erence observed by AN&R. The credibility channel will likely mat-
ter because, when the likelihood of drawing ten increases, reporting ten appears more credible
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Figure 4. Experimental data from AN&R’s F10 LOW and F10 HIGH treatments
Note: The histogram shows the distribution of reports for two (between-subject) treatments
conducted by AN&R, with a total of 284 participants. The blue dots illustrate the expected
distribution of draws. The data used in this figure is available under https://doi.org/10.
3982/ECTA14673.
and participants have smaller incentives to disguise their lie by lying partially. In addition, the
increase in the probability of drawing a ten comes at the expense of a decrease in the probability
of drawing a seven. Therefore, the composition of liars could also be a ected by the treatment;
participants might believe that liars are more likely to have drawn a number smaller than
seven in the treatment where ten is more likely than in the treatment where seven is more
likely. This in turn would increase the average quality of liars and thus the perceived attrac-
tiveness of lying. Both channels predict the observed treatment e ect and could thus jointly
account for the observed data.
4 Experiment
I design an experiment to test the main implications of the model. The reasons for doing an
experiment are twofold. First, while there are a number of experiments that test for credi-
bility, the quality channel has not been investigated empirically so far. Second, in addition to
measuring behavior, the experiment also elicits beliefs about lying. This way, I can establish
whether actions are systematically related to beliefs in ways suggested by the image motive.
4.1 Design
4.1.1 Game
The experiment employs a three-state lying game. Throughout this section, and in accordance
with the language used in the experiment, the three states are called Red, Blue, and Green.
Red is the highest state and reporting it results in a monetary payo  of 12 euros. Reporting
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Blue gives a slightly lower payo  of 10 euros and reporting Green results in 2 euros. To gain
more control about the choices liars can take, the lying game is restricted. Figure 5 displays
the extensive form of the restricted game. The restricted game di ers in two respects from the
F&FH lying game. First, partial lying is ruled out by restricting the choice set of potential liars
to either report the truth, or to lie and report Red. This feature gives control about the actions
liars can take, and simplifies the analysis as it rules out the intensive lying margin. Second,
the states are not uniformly distributed but drawn with probabilities p (Red), (1  p)q (Green),
and (1  p)(1 q) (Blue).
In the experiment, the main treatment variation comes from changing the probability of
either drawing the high state (a change in p) or one of the lower states (a change in q). These
variations address the two di erent signaling channels. Consider first a change in p. When
decreasing p, the proportion of agents that lie for any given reputation of the highest state,
j, is higher, because less agents draw Red. At the same time, the composition of liars does
not change. That is, there is only a credibility but no quality e ect. This will make reporting
the high state ultimately less attractive. Because fewer participants draw Red, reporting it
appears less credible.
Proposition 3. A decrease in the probability of drawing Red, p, leads to a decrease in j⇤.
Turning to comparative statics with respect to q, things get a bit more complicated, because
a change in q induces both, a change in the amount and in the composition of liars. The following
proposition consists of two parts, with part (i) characterizing the general case and part (ii)
giving a su cient condition for which the quality e ect dominates the credibility e ect.
Proposition 4. If the probability of drawing Green, q, increases, then
(i) P(lie) increases.
(ii) E(t|t̂ 2 (t̂B(j⇤), t̂G(j⇤))) > E(t) is a su cient condition for j⇤ to increase.
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What intuitively matters for the quality e ect to dominate the credibility e ect is whether
the initial amount of lying is high or low. If the initial amount of lying is high enough, the e ect
of an improved quality of liars dominates the increased amount of liars. In this case reporting
Red becomes more attractive and lies are strategic complements.
The experiment can be thought of as a more simplified and decomposed version of AN&R’s
second experiment on lying and image concerns. As in their game, participants with di erent
material incentives to lie decide whether to lie or not. When lying, they pool with participants
from all other states. The current experiment simplifies the game by focusing on three di erent
payo  states instead of ten, which should be su cient to generate di erences in the quality of
liars. It also gets at decomposing credibility and quality by (i) either introducing an experimen-
tal manipulation which changes the credibility of reporting the highest state, holding constant
the composition of liars, or, (ii) introducing an experimental manipulation which changes the
composition of liars while having only a second-order e ect on the credibility of reporting the
highest state.
4.1.2 Implementation
The experimental lying game follows the code-reporting design introduced by Feess and Kerzen-
macher (2018). Participants draw a random envelope from a box. The envelope consists of two
parts, a code sheet and a lottery ticket. Each envelope contains either a Red-Blue or a Red-
Green code sheet. Red-Blue code sheets include two four-digit codes for Red and Blue and
Red-Green code sheets include two four-digit codes for Red and Green. The lottery ticket can
either be a win or a loss. Upon finding a win in the envelope, participants are instructed to
write down the code for Red on a sheet of paper. In case of a loss they are told to write down
the code for the other color. After all participants write down one code, they throw the enve-
lope with the code sheet and lottery ticket in a box. Thereafter, they type their code into the
computer, which then registers the lottery payo . The codes for each color are the same for
all participants, so that it is impossible for the experimenter to find out whether participants
really typed the code into the computer that they were supposed to. The procedure gives par-
ticipants a clear monetary incentive to lie and to report the code for Red instead of Blue or
Green. At the same time, in case they are going to lie, participants have to lie to the full extent
and report Red.
4.1.3 Treatments and hypotheses
There are three treatments which vary the probabilities of drawing Red, Blue, or Green. Figure
6 displays the distribution of envelopes in each of them. In all treatments, twelve participants
take part in one session at the same time. In     , four participants in each session are in-
structed to report Red (which pays 12 euros), six to report Blue (which pays 10 euros), and two
to report Green (which pays 2 euros). In the high quality treatment,   , the proportion of par-
ticipants drawing Blue and Green switches compared to baseline. Thus, while the average liar
draws Blue in     , the average liar will draw Green in   . A participant who draws Green is
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Figure 6. Treatments
(a)      (b)   
(c)   
Note: All envelopes contain codes for Red and one additional color, as indicated by the blue and green dots.
Envelopes with an “L” contain a loss and envelopes with a “W” contain a win.
relatively unlucky and would earn only a small amount. Therefore, lying after drawing Green
is arguably more justified than lying after drawing Blue. In the language of the model, liars in
   on average are of higher quality than liars in     . Comparing lying behavior between     
and    gives an indication of how the composition of liars influences lying behavior. As more
participants draw Green in   , the average liar has a better reason to lie. The positive image
spillovers on other participants will increase lying, conditional on the draw.
Hypothesis 1 (Related to proposition 4). The fraction of participants lying, conditional on the
draw, is higher in    than in     .
In the low probability treatment,   , only one participant in each session draws Red as com-
pared to four in     . Conversely, more participants draw one of the lower states The winning
lot for the    treatment was included in one random envelope for each session before the ex-
periment.16 Therefore, reporting Red is less credible in   , which should lead to a decrease in
conditional lying.
Hypothesis 2 (Related to proposition 3). The fraction of participants lying, conditional on the
draw, is lower in    than in     .
16Because of this, and in contrast to the remaining treatments, the draw distribution in    is not deterministic.
This was mainly done because it has the advantage of substantially reducing the probability of drawing Red as
compared to     , while at the same time ensuring a positive probability of winning after drawing either Red-Blue
or Red-Green. Otherwise, motives such as spite and experimenter demand e ects might motivate some participants
in    to lie if they draw a code combination they never could have won with anyway.
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4.1.4 Additional experimental features
Additional experimental features are summarized below. The precise instructions of the ex-
periment can be found in appendix D.
Before the lying game and after reading the experimental instructions, participants have
to state their beliefs about how many participants they think reported Red, Blue and Green in
a previous session of the same game. Participants are incentivized to report their true beliefs
with a quadratic scoring rule.17 The timing of the belief elicitation before the choice is in line
with Rauhut (2013), who runs a lying game with and without belief elicitation prior to choice
and finds no impact of the elicitation on behavior.
To increase the image aspect, all participants have to stand up at the end of the exper-
iment and announce the color that they reported in front of the experimenter and all other
participants. This is known to the participants before they take their reporting decision. Be-
cause participants draw from a lottery without replacement, during the public announcements
participants can find out about the exact number of liars, ruling out chance as an alternative
explanation.
One might worry that a lottery without replacement increases the perceived fear of pun-
ishment among participants. Participants could for example fear individual or collective pun-
ishment if the report and draw distribution in their session do not coincide. Because of this,
the instructions are careful in describing to participants that their draws can not be tracked
individually, that they will receive the money corresponding to their report, and that there will
not be an additional stage of the experiment after they make their public announcements.
4.2 Procedures
The experimental sessions were run in November and December 2019 in the WZB/TU lab in
Berlin. Recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experimental software
was programmed with oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016). Participants first read
the instructions in private and after everyone finished they were verbally summarized by the
experimenter. Thereafter, participants had to answer control questions that tested their un-
derstanding of di erent aspects of the game. After the belief elicitation and lottery decision,
participants answered a number of demographic questions and an open question about how
they took the decision in the experiment. Sessions lasted for around 30 minutes. In addi-
tion to their experimental earnings, participants received 5Ä as a show-up fee. Average earn-
ings were around 18Ä. In total 360 participants took part in the experiment (42% female),
144 each in      and in    and 72 in   . There are less observations in    because only
one participant draws Red in    compared to four in the other treatments, i.e. more partic-
ipants take an active decision in each session of   . The preregistration of the experimental
game, of the main hypotheses and their analysis, and of the sample size is available under
17For each participant the computer randomly chooses their stated belief for one of the three states as payo 





This section will first examine choice behavior before going over to beliefs.
5.1 Choice behavior
Figure 7 presents results. The table in the left panel shows regressions of an indicator whether
a participant lied or not on a treatment dummy, controlling for the draw.18 There are two major
takeaways from the table. First, monetary stakes significantly impact lying. Participants who
draw Blue, and thus have a smaller monetary gain from lying, are around 27 percentage points
less likely to lie than participants who draw Green. The right panel in figure 7 further shows
that this holds individually in all treatments. Second, the regressions show no evidence that
signaling concerns matters for lying. When comparing lying behavior between      and   
in column 1, there is a small but insignificant treatment e ect. Column 2 compares behavior
between      and    and finds a nonsignificant treatment e ect with a point estimate very
close to zero.
Result 1 (Related to hypothesis 1). The fraction of participants lying, conditional on the draw,
is not significantly di erent between    and     .
Result 2 (Related to hypothesis 2). The fraction of participants lying, conditional on the draw,
is not significantly di erent between    and     .
5.2 Beliefs
The null results from the previous part could be driven by two distinct reasons. Either, image
concerns at most had a small e ect on behavior in this experiment, or participants are image
concerned but their beliefs are inconsistent with equilibrium strategies.
In fact, beliefs are very heterogenous within treatments. Figure 8 shows scatter plots for
stated beliefs about how many participants reported Green and Blue. The figure also highlights
two kinds of stated beliefs that are inconsistent with basic image models of lying. Beliefs that
fall in the region to the left of the dashed line and below the shaded area imply that the fraction
of Blue participants lying is higher than the fraction of Green participants lying. This violates
the property that more individuals lie the higher the monetary gain from lying. Beliefs in the
shaded area are only consistent with downwards lying from Red participants. The majority
of stated beliefs are however free of violations, with 76-90% of participants in each treatment
stating beliefs that are consistent with both properties.
18Lying cannot observed individually, but because the draw distribution is deterministic, the individual data
used in the regression can be recovered.
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Note: The left panel presents OLS regressions with lie as dependent variable. Blue is a dummy equal to one
if the participant drew Blue.    and    are two treatment dummies. Column 1 presents regressions using
only observations from treatments      and   . Column 2 presents regressions using only observations from
treatments      and   . All regressions exclude observations of participants that drew Red. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01. The right panel displays the fraction of liars who drew Blue and Green by
treatment. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals.
5.2.1 Coding liars
Two additional lab sessions were run to obtain more precise data on the heterogeneity of beliefs.
At the end of the main experiment, participants answered an open question that asked them to
reason about how they took their decision in the experiment. Only participants who did not take
part in the original experiment took part in the additional sessions. They worked as evaluators
and were tasked to read the answers to the open question in the original experiment and to
judge which of the participants they suspect of lying. Table 1 contains explanations from six
participants reporting Red in one example session of     . Since only four participants drew
Red, but six participants reported Red, two of these four participants must have lied.19
19Downwards lying was in principle possible in the experiment and thus it could be the case that more than two
out of the six participants in the table lied. This is however very unlikely. Red was never reported by less than
the number of participants who drew it in any of the 33 experimental sessions. In addition, experimental evidence
on downwards lying is only observed for very selected samples and special design features. In an experiment with
nuns, Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) find evidence that is consistent with downward lying. Barron (2019) finds
more systematic evidence that lab participants lie downwards on a small stakes die when they simultaneously
have the opportunity to lie upwards on a high stakes die. Throughout the results discussion I will maintain the
assumption that no participant lied downwards.
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Note: Beliefs about the number of participants reporting Blue and Green. Larger bubbles indi-
cate more observations. Stated beliefs above the dashed line and below the shaded area violate
the monotonicity property that individuals lie more if stakes increase. Stated beliefs in the gray
shaded area violate the no downwards lying condition.
Table 1. Example answers
Participant id Reasoning Coded suspicion ˆlie
1 I am here to earn as much money as possible
in the shortest time.
0.921 1
2 I wanted to earn a lot of money. 0.868 1
3 I took all of my decisions in accordance with
the rules.
0.079 0
4 By drawing the main prize 0.053 0
5 Honestly 0.026 0
6 I was the last one and took the envelope 0.053 0
Note: The table reports answers of participants reporting Red to the question “Please give a
concise explanation of how you took your decision in the experiment” in one session of     .
Answers and the wording of the question have been translated from German.
Evaluators in the coding sessions sequentially read all explanations participants reporting
Red gave in the main experiment and had to evaluate whether a participant reported Red
dishonestly or not. They saw answers of all participants reporting Red in the same session at
the same time, as in table 1. The sequence of sessions and of answers within sessions were
presented to each evaluator in random order. These additional sessions lasted for one hour
each. Evaluators earned a flat wage of 10 euros and could gain 7 additional euros if they judged
one randomly chosen answer in the same way as a random evaluator in the same session. This
additional incentive was given mainly to keep evaluators motivated to read and evaluate each
answer carefully. In total 38 participants took part in the additional sessions.
The evaluators’ assessments were largely consensual. They coded each individual answer
in the direction of the modal evaluation in 85% of all cases, an improvement over the case where
everyone answered randomly, which would have coincided with the modal answer only 65% of
the time.
From the coded evaluations I generate a suspicion indicator which is the fraction of evalua-
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tors that coded the participant as dishonest. The indicator ˆlie classifies a participant as a liar
if they were amongst the participants who gave the most suspicious answers in a session. In
the example in table 1, participants 1 and 2 get assigned a ˆlie of one because two participants
in that sessions must have lied and they got the highest coded suspicion of all participants in
the same session.
5.2.2 Signaling motives and beliefs
To investigate whether individual-level behavior and beliefs are consistent with image con-
cerns, I create two indicators capture credibility and quality beliefs. The belief about the pro-
portion of participants who tell the truth, conditional on reporting Red, is taken as an indicator
for credibility. The belief about the proportion liars who drew Green is an indicator of the qual-
ity of liars.
Figure 9 presents average credibility and quality beliefs, by action and treatment. Compar-
ing      with   , the belief about quality of liars is significantly higher in    (p < 0.001, Mann-
Whitney test). Similarly, moving from      to   , the credibility belief decreases (p < 0.001,
Mann-Whitney test). These results suggest that, while the treatments were e ective in shift-
ing participant beliefs, these shifts did not a ect behavior.
There is further evidence going against signaling motives. Compare beliefs of nonliars be-
tween      and   . While the average credibility belief of nonliars is similar, average quality
beliefs are higher among nonliars in    (credibility: 0.781     , 0.775   , p = 0.817, Mann-
Whitney test; quality: 0.384     , 0.605   , p = 0.017, Mann-Whitney test). That is, nonliars
in    hold beliefs consistent with a higher image of reporting Red than nonliars in     . If
participants are motivated by high image concerns, credibility and quality beliefs of non-liars
should be the same conditional on telling the truth. A similar point can be made when com-
paring nonliars between    and   . Nonliars in    have lower credibility beliefs, while quality
beliefs are similar (credibility: 0.524   , 0.775   , p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney test; quality: 0.605
  , 0.516   , p = 0.324, Mann-Whitney test).20
5.2.3 Relationship between beliefs and lying behavior
If image concerns cannot explain the data, the question arises if beliefs have any causal role
in determining behavior. One suggestive piece of evidence is that participants might be con-
formists; within every treatment, liars think that more participants lie than nonliars (p< 0.006,
Mann-Whitney tests).21 This correlation is documented in other studies that investigate lying
and beliefs about lying (Abeler, Becker, and Falk, 2014, Hugh-Jones, 2016, Abeler et al., 2019).
AN&R caution against a causal interpretation, because priors and preferences are likely corre-
lated. This can for example happen because of consensus e ects, where individuals overweight
20This argument ignores that nonliars on average have higher financial incentives to lie in   . Incorporating
financial incentives would only lead to the stronger claim that credibility and quality beliefs of nonliars should
actually be lower in   .
21Testing instead whether participants reporting Red hold higher beliefs than other participants gives similar
results (p < 0.013 Mann-Whitney tests).
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Note: Nonliars are participants who reported Blue or Green. Participants who reported Red are classified as
either lying or to have drawn red based on the ˆlie indicator from the coding sessions. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
their own preferences when forming beliefs (see discussions in Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe,
and Johannesson, 2009, Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, and Normann, 2014). This part investi-
gates whether the observed association could be causal.
Consider a model of conformity, where participants incur moral costs of lying which de-
crease if the participant believes that many others are lying. Formally, assume a linearly ad-
ditive utility function of the form
u( j, t,b,a) = y(a)+1a6= j(qb  t), (12)
where b is the participant’s belief about the fraction of participants who are lying and q is a
sensitivity parameter. The notation is otherwise unchanged.
If we are to estimate such a model using the data from the experiment, we have to overcome
two challenges; (i) the actions (lying /truth-telling) are not directly observed and (ii) the con-
sensus e ect discussed above gives reasons to assume a confounding, non-causal relationship
between preferences and beliefs. In face of these challenges, I develop and estimate a struc-
tural model of lying that explicitly models the classification error and allows for a potential
correlation between beliefs and preferences.
We assume that participants have lying costs which are drawn from a log-normal distribu-
tion where log-costs have mean m and standard deviation sm. Each participant’s stated belief
is drawn from a normal distribution which, since beliefs are restricted to lie between zero and
one, is censored at the end points. Beliefs further depend on the treatment and can potentially
be correlated with the lying cost. The equation for a stated belief b of a participant becomes




0 if b⇤ < 0
b⇤ if b⇤ 2 [0,1]
1 if b⇤ > 1,
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where btreatment is a treatment indicator, t is the (unobserved) lying cost, r is a parameter that
measures the correlation between lying costs and beliefs and e is a normally distributed i.i.d.
error term with expectation zero and standard deviation sb. The modeling of the belief function
closely follows the empirical framework of Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel (2011), who control
for a potential correlation between preferences and beliefs when estimating guilt aversion. A
negative r is consistent with a consensus e ect, as it implies that participants with lower lying
costs believe that a large fraction of participants are lying. Intuitively r is identified across
treatments as the treatments generate variation in beliefs which should be uncorrelated with
intrinsic preferences. Therefore, between-treatment variations in behavior can be attributed
to a direct causal impact of beliefs on lying, while the remaining within-treatment variation in
beliefs and behavior will be attributed to the consensus e ect.
Assume that the utility derived from lying and truth-telling is further influenced by an i.i.d.
error term which follows the extreme-value type 1 distribution, so that a standard logit choice
model arises, where the probability of a participant lying after drawing Green is equal to




and analogously for a participant who drew Blue. We further maintain the assumption of
no downwards lying. This implies that a participant who drew Red always reports Red with
probability one.
I estimate the model via maximum likelihood. One challenge when estimating the model
is that we do not perfectly observe lies, as participants who reported Red could have either
reported truthfully or lied. This is a problem of classification error, which can be dealt with
by explicitly taking account of the probability of misclassification in the likelihood function
(Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998). Appendix C includes details on the estimation.
Table 2 presents estimates, first for two restricted models which ignore the relationship
between beliefs and lying and between preferences and beliefs. The model in the last column
takes account of both. It is interesting to observe that the LC + Beliefs model, which ignores the
correlation between beliefs and preferences, predicts a strongly positive relationship between
beliefs about lying and behavior. Its estimates imply that a ten percentage point increase
in the belief among participants leads to a seven percentage point increase in the fraction of
participants who lie. This relationship becomes small and insignificant once we allow for a
correlation between beliefs and preferences in the fully specified model. The correlation in
turn is significantly negative, consistent with a consensus e ect, where participants with a
higher wilingness to lie also expect many others to lie.
6 Discussion
The paper presented a model where agents derive reputational esteem if they are perceived as
being of honest character. Such a model can explain many of the previous experimental results
on lying games. While it was narrowly applied to study games of the die-roll type, the model
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Table 2. Likelihood estimates
LC only LC + Beliefs Fully specified
m 2.209⇤⇤⇤ 2.621⇤⇤⇤ 2.363⇤⇤⇤
(0.163) (0.1) (0.169)






bBase 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.029) (0.076)
bHQ 0.278⇤⇤⇤ 0.278⇤⇤⇤ 0.577⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.028) (0.08)
bLP 0.199⇤⇤⇤ 0.199⇤⇤⇤ 0.495⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.039) (0.085)
sb 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.212⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Log-likelihood  350.012  327.262  318.578
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
could be modified to study relevant economic environments, such as credence goods markets
or markets for financial advice. The paper aimed to clarify some of the di erences between
the model and other theoretical approaches which conceptualize the reputational cost of lying
by interpreting a lie as a bad deed. The predictions between both approaches mainly di er
because the signaling motive in the character-based image model is driven by an additional
quality e ect.
The experimental results do not show evidence for belief-dependent preferences. They fail
to confirm a new quality e ect which is theoretically explored in this paper, but also find no
evidence that credibility of the report matters. The results therefore are largely in contrast
with previous experiments that find support for the credibility e ect (Feess and Kerzenmacher,
2018, Gneezy et al., 2018, Abeler et al., 2019).
One important aspect that could have influenced the experimental results in this paper is
that the instructions were relatively clear that lies would not be punished and that there was no
trick involved in the experiment.22 Perceived fear of punishment has been shown to influence
lying behavior in the standard game with replacement (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). The
threat of punishment can provide instrumental reasons to appear credible if there is a risk of
being caught cheating and punished. Therefore, one reason for the observed di erences might
be that some of the behavior consistent with image concerns in previous experiments was trig-
22Some evidence that participants understood this comes from the answers to the open question at the end of
the experiment. The majority of truth-tellers, for example, justifies their behavior on the moral ground that lying
is bad, instead of fear of punishment.
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gered by a fear of punishment and does not constitute a pure (non-instrumental) image concern.
This interpretation is also consistent with the experimental finding that belief-dependent pref-
erences do not seem to matter in sender-receiver games (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013),
where ambiguity about the game and about punishment capabilities of the receiver should
be much less pronounced. López-Pérez and Spiegelman set up a sender-receiver game and,
similarly to this experiment, vary the distribution of draws. Like in the present experiment,
they find that this manipulation does not a ect behavior, even though they observe a strongly
positive correlation between behavior and beliefs. The present experiment has however little
to say about whether perceived punishment motivates the type of disguisive behavior typically
observed in experimental lying games. One promising direction for future research would be
to more systematically test its e ect.
The current experiment also di ers from former experiments in that the audience partic-
ipants signaled to was extended. In standard lying experiments, participants usually only
report to the experimenter, without an additional public announcement. This might have had
the unintended consequence that participants were signaling to multiple audiences, which
might obscure their signaling motive. Public reports of actions are a usual way of intensifying
image concerns in experiments (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009, Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017,
Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018). This might however not always trigger the intended sig-
naling motive. A striking example of this is Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) who conduct a
dictator game experiment with first-year economics students. The dictator giving rates are
either kept anonymous or publicly announced. Dufwenberg and Muren find that students ac-
tually become less generous if their action is made public. While these concerns cannot be
ruled out, the current experiment finds little evidence that beliefs have any causal e ect on
behavior.
The experimental results do however confirm previous evidence on the consensus e ect in
the lying domain. In particular, I provide quantitative evidence that beliefs about lying are
correlated with behavior because preferences and beliefs are correlated. It would be interest-
ing to theoretically think through formal concepts that can accommodate consensus e ects and
study their strategic implications. From an empirical perspective, the framework that I present
explicitly takes account of the classification error inherent in experimental lying games. The
model provides consistent parameter estimates and could be used in future research to empir-
ically estimate relations between individual-level characteristics and actions in lying games.
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A Proofs
Notation Throughout the proof section, I will use M (t̂) ⌘ E(t|t  t̂) to simplify notation.
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
We first provide two lemmatas before proceeding with the proof.
Lemma 1 (Properties of t̂(D(K, j),j)). The following properties hold for t̂(D(K, j),j) if j /2Q and
µ is small enough, E(t|t > t̂) is convex in t̂.
(i) dt̂(D(K, j),j)dj 2 (0,1).
(ii) d
2t̂(D(K, j),j)
djdD(K, j)  0.
Proof. t̂(D(K, j),j) is implicitly defined in
t̂ + µ [R j(t̂) j] D(K, j) = 0.





1+ µR 0j(t̂(D(K, j),j))
if j  k⇤,
R 0j(t̂(D(K, j),j)) =
dE(t|t>t̂(D(K, j),j))
dt̂ > 0. Therefore, the derivative is between 0 and 1 if µ is small
(e.g. µ  1).




µR 00j (t̂(D(K, j),j))
dt̂(D(K, j),j)
dD(K, j)
(1+ µR 0j(t̂(D(K, j),j)))2
 0,
as it is easily verified that dt̂(D(K, j),j)dD(K, j) > 0 and, as R j(t̂) = E(t|t > t̂), R 00j (t̂)   0.
Lemma 2 (Properties of L (j)). L (j) is (i) a continuous function with (ii) L 0(j)< 1. There exists
(iii) a unique value x 2 (0,E(t)) such that L (x ) = x .
Proof. (i) The functions t̂ j(j), F(t) and M (t) are continuous functions. It follows that L (j) is
continuous on each range of values for j that do not change the threshold state k⇤.
To see that L (j) is continuous around the values of j that induce a change in k⇤, we examine the
case where y(K)+ µj 0 = y(k0)+ µE(t). Consider an e > 0 which is arbitrarily small. Obviously,
permuting j 0 to j 0 + e induces a continuous change in L (j) as it does not change k⇤. If we look
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at j 0   e, the threshold state changes to k0  1 and thus

















F(t̂ j(j 0   e))
  F(t̂k






































By continuity of t̂ j(j) for j < k0, and by continuity of F(t) it follows that lim
e!0
F(t̂ j(j 0 e)) = F(t̂ j(j 0))
for j < k0. Furthermore, since for j 0 e the threshold state is k0 1, by definition of the threshold
function, t̂k0(j 0   e) = 0.
An increase in the threshold state is followed by a continuous change of the threshold function.






Plugging in j 0 = E(t)  D(K,k
0)
µ , it becomes visible that the only solution for t̂k0(j 0) = 0. It follows
that lim
e!0
t̂k0(j 0 e) = 0 and therefore lime!0F(t̂k0(j
0 e)) = F(0) = 0. This implies that lim
e!0
a(j 0 e) = 1.
Moreover, M (0) = 0 and therefore lim
e!0
c(j 0   e) = 0. It follows that
lim
e!0
L (j 0   e) = lim
e!0









= L (j 0).
The function is thus continuous.














M (t̂ j(j)) (13)




F(t) . By log-concavity of f (t) the integral in the fraction is log-concave, which
implies that t  M (t) is increasing.23 From this, we conclude that M 0(t) 2 (0,1). Further, dt̂ jdj 2
23This follows from the property that for a log-concave function g(x), g(x)g0(x) is increasing in x. See for example
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)
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(0,1) as shown in the previous lemma. It follows that P(draw j|lie)M 0(t̂ j(j)) dt̂ jdj < P(draw j|lie)











P(draw j|lie) = 1.
We now show that the second term in equation (13) is weakly smaller than zero. First note
that Â jk⇤ dP(draw j|lie)dj = 0, as the probabilities always add up to one. In the case where k⇤ = 1 it
then straightforwardly follows that the second term is zero. For cases k⇤ > 1, denote by S+ and
S  the set of all states j  k⇤ for which with dP(draw j|lie)dj > 0 and
dP(draw j|lie)
dj  0 respectively. We


















which in particular holds if min
j2S 
{M (t̂ j(j))} > max
j2S+
{M (t̂ j(j))}. We know that M (t̂1(j)) > ... >
M (t̂k⇤(j)). Hence, it is su cient to show that there exists a z 2 {1,k⇤} so that S  = { j| j 2 K , j 
z}. In words, we need to show that a marginal increase in j leads to a relative decline in
the proportion of liars who draw low states, as compared to liars who draw high states. The









where c = Âlk⇤ f (t̂l) ∂ t̂l∂j is a constant which is the same for all j  k⇤. This implies that
dP(draw j|lie)
dj <
















for all j < k < k⇤, (14)








dj . Thus, if there exists a z with
∂P(draw z|lie)
∂j  0,
then dP(draw j|lie)dj < 0 for all j < z. Existence of z follows from the fact that the derivatives always
have to add up to zero. The second term in the derivative is therefore weakly negative. This
concludes the proof of the claim that L 0(j) < 1.
(iii) The assumptions on the payo  function ensure that some agents always lie regardless
of the reputational penalty and that some agents always tell the truth even if there is no repu-
tational penalty from lying. The first implies that L (0) > 0, as some types will lie even if j = 0.
The second property implies that L (E(t))< E(t) as the types with the highest lying cost tell the
truth even if j = E(t). Since L (j) is continuous and L 0(j) 2 (0,1), it then follows that there
exists a unique fixed point x 2 (0,E(t)) such that L (x ) = x .
Proof of proposition 1. I omit the proofs for claims (i) (iv) in the proposition as they have been
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given in the text and instead focus on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Claim 1: For every j there exists a unique threshold value k⇤ which is the maximum integer
j 2 {1, ...,K   1} such that y(K)+ µj   y( j)+ µE(t). Assume that there is a k⇤ for which y(K)+
µj  y(k⇤) + µE(t). But then, individuals can profitably deviate and report k⇤, as in such an
equilibrium R k⇤ > E(t) > j, and hence
y(k⇤)+ µR k⇤ > y(K)+ µj.
This establishes that for any k⇤, y(K)+ µj > y(k⇤)+ µE(t).
To see that k⇤ is the largest integer, consider a case where k⇤ < k0 and
y(K)+ µj > y(k0)+ µE(t).
Since k0 is now being lied at, R k0 < E(t). The inequality is a contradiction to the condition that
in any such equilibrium, y(K)+ µj = y(k0)+ µR k0 .




i=1 F(t̂ j(j)). S is continuous with S0(j) > 0. The first part follows because agents only lie if
they draw a state smaller or equal k⇤ and lie if they have a lying cost lower than the threshold
cost t̂ j(j). Therefore, the fraction of agents who are liars is given by S
Continuity of S follows from very similar arguments as the ones that were used to show the
continuity of L (j). Consider a j 0 such that y(K)+ µj 0 = y(k0)+ µE(t) and subtract a minimal
amount e > 0 to j 0   e. The threshold state now becomes k0  1, and




















0 e)) = F(0) = 0, it follows that lim
e!0
S(j 0 
e) = S(j 0). Moreover, F 0(t) > 0 and t̂ 0j(j) > 0 for j  k⇤ and thus S0(j) > 0 – the supply of lies in-
creases in the reputation of the highest state.




r j(j) is continuous with D
0(j) < 0. In




P(report j)⇥P(lie|report j). (15)
We defined r j = P(truth|report j). By Bayes’ Rule,
r j =
P(report j ^ truth)
P(report j) for j > k
⇤.
Observe that in equilibrium exactly 1K agents report each state j > k⇤ truthfully. Thus, we can
rearrange the above equation to


















We can derive an expression for r j depending on j by noting that,
E(t| j) = r jE(t)+(1  r j)L (j) for all j > k⇤
and use the indi erence conditions to replace E(t| j) = j + D(K, j)µ for j > k⇤ to derive
r j(j) =

















j +D(K, j)/µ  L (j) .
To see that D(j) is continuous, we again have to consider a value j 0 such that y(K) + µj 0 =
y(k0)+ µE(t). The threshold state for j 0 is k0, while it is k0  1 for j  e, where e is an arbitrarily
small but positive scalar. After plugging in the equilibrium conditions we have





E(t)  (j 0   e + D(K, j)µ )







E(t)  (j 0   e + D(K, j)µ )




E(t)  (j 0   e + D(K,k
0)
µ )
j 0   e + D(K,k
0)
µ  L (j 0   e)
.
In the limit where e ! 0, j 0  e + D(K,k
0)
µ = E(t). The second term in the equation above therefore
becomes zero in the limit zero, and as L (j) and E(t| j) are continuous, D(j 0   e) ! D(j 0). D(j)






L 0(j)(E(t) E(t| j))  (E(t) L (j))
(E(t| j) L (j))2 .
A su cient condition for the derivative to be negative is that the numerator in the fraction
above is negative for every j > k⇤. Since E(t| j) > L (j), a su cient condition for the derivative
to be negative is that
L 0(j) < 1,
which was shown in lemma 2.
Claim 4: There exists a unique j⇤ 2 (z ,E(t)) such that D(j⇤) = S(j⇤). From the previous
claims, it follows that D(j) and S(j) are both continuous functions with D0(j)< 0 and S0(j)> 0.
The intermediate value theorem guarantees a unique j⇤ such that D(j⇤) = S(j⇤). For existence
of j⇤, observe that the parameter assumptions guarantee that S(j) 2 (0,1) for all j 2 (x ,E(t)).
When j ! x , j  L (j) ! 0 and thus lim
j!x














[D(j) S(j)] > 0, and lim
j!E(t)
[D(j) S(j)] < 0.
As the di erence is continuous and strictly decreasing there exists a unique j⇤ 2 (z ,E(t)) such
that D(j⇤) = S(j⇤).
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Claim 1: K 2 Q l Assume the opposite and observe that K is always reported dishonestly by
some agent. It follows that
y(K)+ µhRK   y( j)+ µhR j
and
y( j)+ µlR j > y(K)+ µlRK for some j 6= K.
Combining both inequalities yields µl > D(K, j)R j R K   µh, a contradiction to µl < µh.
Claim 2: The intersection Q l \Q h is at most a singleton. Assume the opposite. Then, there
exist at least two states j,k 2 Q l,Q h. For both
y(k)+ µhRk = y( j)+ µhR j,
y(k)+ µlRk = y( j)+ µlR j.
Combining both equalities implies µh = D(k, j)R j R k = µl, which is a contradiction to µl < µh.
Claim 3: Q l and Q h can intersect only at the minimum j 2 Q l. For |Q h| = 1 this is trivial.
For |Q h| > 1, we know from claim 1 that
y(K)+ µlRK = y( j)+ µlR j for all j 2 Q l.
Since µh > µl, this implies that for h-types,
y(K)+ µhR K < y(K  1)+ µhR K 1 < ... < y(m)+ µhR m,
where m is the minimum element in Q l. Therefore, any h-liar prefers to report m.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
We know from propositon 1 that j⇤ is implicitly defined by D(j⇤, p,q)  S(j⇤, p,q) = 0. In the
restricted game, the demand and supply functions are the following:
D(j, p,q) = p⇥ E(t) j
j  L (j,q)
S(j, p,q) = (1  p)q⇥F(t̂G(j))+(1  p)(1 q)⇥F(t̂B(j)).
(16)








Also from proposition 1 we know that denominator is positive. Taking derivatives of the func-
tions specified in (16) gives (note that L (j,q) only depends on q, but not on p)
Dp(j, p,q) =
E(t) j
j  L (j,q) > 0
Sp(j, p,q) =  qF(t̂G(j))  (1 q)F(t̂B(j)) < 0.
We conclude that dj
⇤
dp > 0.
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
(i) From equations (16), it follows that
Dq(j, p,q) = p⇥
Lq(j,q)
j  L (j,q)D(j, p,q),
Sq(j, p,q) = (1  p) [F(t̂G(j)) F(t̂B(j))] .





[M (t̂B(j)) M (t̂G(j))] ,
where P(draw Blue|lie) = (1 q)F(t̂B(j))(1 q)F(t̂B(j))+qF(t̂G(j)) , which is decreasing in q. Therefore Dq(j, p,q) is
also positive. Since both Sq(j, p,q) and Dq(j, p,q) are positive it directly follows that P(lie) is
higher the higher q.
(ii) In equilibrium
j⇤ = pE(t)+(1  p) [(1 q)F(t̂B(j
⇤))M (t̂B(j⇤))+qF(t̂G(j⇤))M (t̂G(j⇤))]




F(j, p,q) = j  g(j, p,q).







The denominator is always positive as gj(j, p,q) < 1. The sign of the whole derivative is thus
determined by the sign of the derivative in the numerator, which becomes
gq(j, p,q) =




The second term in the numerator is always negative, while the first term is negative if
F(t̂G) [E(t) M (t̂G(j))] < F(t̂B(j)) [E(t) M (t̂B(j))]










) E(t) < E(t|t 2 (t̂B(j), t̂G(j))).
A su cient condition for the last inequality to hold is that t̂B(j⇤) > E(t).
B Example of a non-symmetric equilibrium
This section provides an example of an equilibrium where the reports of liars depends on their
lying cost. Consider a setup with K = 3 and the following strategy profile:
s( j| j, t) = 1 if j > 1,
s(3|1, t) = 1 if t  t̂a
s(2|1, t) = 1 if t 2 (t̂a, t̂b]
s(1|1, t) = 1 if t   t̂b.
That is, agents lie only if they draw 1. There are two quality segments of liars. Liars with the
worst quality report the highest state and other liars report the middle state.
Assume preferences are uniformly distributed between zero and T > 0. The equilibrium
reputations are
R 1(T, t̂b) =
T + t̂b
2




2 +(t̂a + t̂b)(t̂b   t̂a)
T + t̂b   t̂a







The equilibrium is characterized by two threshold values (t̂a, t̂b) and two indi erence conditions.
The first is that the agent of type (1, t̂b) must be indi erent between lying and truthtelling;




(D(3,1)+ µ(R3(T, t̂a) T )) .
(17)
The second equilibrium condition is that liars must be indi erent between reporting states
2 and 3;
y(3)+ µR 3(T, t̂a) = y(2)+ µR 2(T, t̂a, t̂b). (18)
Consider parameter values µ = 1, T = 7, y(1) = 0, y(2) = 4.9, and y(3) = 5. We can plug equation
(17) into equation (18) and solve for t̂a. The resulting parameter values are t̂a ⇡ 1.12 and t̂b ⇡ 3.06,
which imply that each of the states are reported (from low to high) with frequencies 18.75%,
42.57%, and 38.68%. Note that in this example, the second-highest state is reported with a
higher frequency than the highest state. In the symmetric equilibrium with homogeneous im-
age concerns the reporting frequencies are monotonely increasing in j. Therefore, the example
induces a di erent reporting frequency than the one induced by symmetric equilibrium.
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C Details on the maximum likelihood estimation
The individual likelihood contributions are derived at as follows: Consider a participant who
reports Green and holds some belief bi. Their probability of truth-telling, given the model
parameters, is P(report Green|draw Green,bi, ti) and the probability of observing such a belief
is g(bi  btreatment  rti), where g is the normal p.d.f. (c.d.f.) if bi is between zero and one (equal to
zero or one). The total likelihood contribution of this participant is then derived by integrating
out the unobserved lying cost ti, whose c.d.f. is denoted by F(ti);
Z
P(report Green|draw Green,bi, ti)g(bi  btreatment  rti)dF(ti).
The likelihood contribution of an individual who reported Red is more ambiguous, as they
could have either reported truthfully or lied. Thus, any participant who reports red could have
(i) drawn Red and told the truth, (ii) drawn Blue and lied, or (iii) drawn Green and lied. This








We can sometimes further exploit session-level variation on the colors that liars drew to in-
crease the e ciency of the estimator. For example, if in one session all individuals who drew
Blue told the truth, we can set q to zero (keeping the probability of having drawn Green at
(1  p)(1 q)) for observations from that session only.
Taking logs and summing up the individual likelihood contributions gives the log-likelihood
function, which is then maximized with respect to the unknown parameters.
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D Experimental instructions




12 people will take part in today’s experiment. The experiment consists of a lottery. You will
first draw a prize in secret which you will have to register. There are three di erent lottery
prizes, which we will call Red, Blue, and Green. You will receive an amount of money depending
on the color you report. At the end of the experiment, you will tell all other participants and
the experimenter which prize you won.
The table below displays all possible payouts which you can earn in the lottery.
Reported color Red Blue Green
Payout 12e 10e 2e
The lottery will be the only task in today’s experiment. It will proceed as follows: We will come
and ask you to draw an envelope from a box. There are two winning codes in the envelope.
Every winning code consists of a digit code. You have to report the code to receive your prize
from the experimenter.
Nine participants will draw an envelope which contains the winning codes for Red and Blue.
The remaining three participants will draw an envelope with the winning codes for Red and
Green.
There exists one winning code for each color. That is, for example, all participants see exactly
the same winning code for Red.
Every envelope additionally contains a lot, which can either be a “win” or a “loss”.
If “win” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for Red on the scrap sheet in front
of you.
If “loss” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for the other color on the scrap
sheet in front of you.
There are four winning lots in total, three of which are in the Red-Blue envelopes and one which
is in the Red-Green envelopes. It follows that four participants will be asked to report Red, six
will be asked to report Blue, and two will be asked to report Green.
Figure 1 (on the extra sheet of paper on your desk) presents the lottery graphically: There
are twelve envelopes of which you randomly draw one. Every envelope contains two winning
codes. There are nine envelopes that contain winning codes for Red and Blue. Six of these
nine envelopes contain a loss (L) and three contain a win (W). The remaining three envelopes
contain winning codes for Red and Green. There are two losses and one win contained in these
envelopes.
Please note the following properties of the lottery:
• 4 participants win Red, 6 participants win Blue and 2 participants win Green.
• Every person sees 2 out of 3 possible winning codes.
• All participants see the winning code for Red.
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• No participant who wins Green sees the winning code of Blue.
• No participant who wins Blue sees the winning code of Green.
After all participants denoted their code, we will come with a sealed box into which you can
throw your envelope and lot. We will destroy all envelopes and lots after the experiment. This
procedure ensures that neither the remaining participants, nor the experimenters will find out
which envelope you drew.
Report your winning code thereafter to the computer program. The program will register your
color and you will receive the corresponding euro amount at the end of the experiment.
Before you leave the room to pick up your payout, you will see your payout and reported color
on your screen. We will then ask you to stand up. Thereafter, we will come one after another
to every participant and will ask you to read out loudly the color reported by you.
Take your time to read through the instructions again and make sure that you understood
everything. Please raise your hand if you have questions and we will come to you.
Please press proceed on your screen once you are finished. Your will then answer some control









12 people will take part in today’s experiment. The experiment consists of a lottery. You will
first draw a prize in secret which you will have to register. There are three di erent lottery
prizes, which we will call Red, Blue, and Green. You will receive an amount of money depending
on the color you report. At the end of the experiment, you will tell all other participants and
the experimenter which prize you won.
The table below displays all possible payouts which you can earn in the lottery.
Reported color Red Blue Green
Payout 12e 10e 2e
The lottery will be the only task in today’s experiment. It will proceed as follows: We will come
and ask you to draw an envelope from a box. There are two winning codes in the envelope.
Every winning code consists of a digit code. You have to report the code to receive your prize
from the experimenter.
Three participants will draw an envelope which contains the winning codes for Red and Blue.
The remaining nine participants will draw an envelope with the winning codes for Red and
Green.
There exists one winning code for each color. That is, for example, all participants see exactly
the same winning code for Red.
Every envelope additionally contains a lot, which can either be a “win” or a “loss”.
If “win” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for Red on the scrap sheet in front
of you.
If “loss” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for the other color on the scrap
sheet in front of you.
There are four winning lots in total, one of which are in the Red-Blue envelopes and three which
are in the Red-Green envelopes. It follows that four participants will be asked to report Red,
two will be asked to report Blue, and six will be asked to report Green.
Figure 1 (on the extra sheet of paper on your desk) presents the lottery graphically: There
are twelve envelopes of which you randomly draw one. Every envelope contains two winning
codes. There are three envelopes that contain winning codes for Red and Blue. Two of these
three envelopes contain a loss (L) and one contains a win (W). The remaining nine envelopes
contain winning codes for Red and Green. There are six losses and three wins contained in
these envelopes.
Please note the following properties of the lottery:
• 4 participants win Red, 2 participants win Blue and 6 participants win Green.
• Every person sees 2 out of 3 possible winning codes.
• All participants see the winning code for Red.
• No participant who wins Green sees the winning code of Blue.
• No participant who wins Blue sees the winning code of Green.
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After all participants denoted their code, we will come with a sealed box into which you can
throw your envelope and lot. We will destroy all envelopes and lots after the experiment. This
procedure ensures that neither the remaining participants, nor the experimenters will find out
which envelope you drew.
Report your winning code thereafter to the computer program. The program will register your
color and you will receive the corresponding euro amount at the end of the experiment.
Before you leave the room to pick up your payout, you will see your payout and reported color
on your screen. We will then ask you to stand up. Thereafter, we will come one after another
to every participant and will ask you to read out loudly the color reported by you.
Take your time to read through the instructions again and make sure that you understood
everything. Please raise your hand if you have questions and we will come to you.
Please press proceed on your screen once you are finished. Your will then answer some control






12 people will take part in today’s experiment. The experiment consists of a lottery. You will
first draw a prize in secret which you will have to register. There are three di erent lottery
prizes, which we will call Red, Blue, and Green. You will receive an amount of money depending
on the color you report. At the end of the experiment, you will tell all other participants and
the experimenter which prize you won.
The table below displays all possible payouts which you can earn in the lottery.
Reported color Red Blue Green
Payout 12e 10e 2e
The lottery will be the only task in today’s experiment. It will proceed as follows: We will come
and ask you to draw an envelope from a box. There are two winning codes in the envelope.
Every winning code consists of a digit code. You have to report the code to receive your prize
from the experimenter.
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Nine participants will draw an envelope which contains the winning codes for Red and Blue.
The remaining three participants will draw an envelope with the winning codes for Red and
Green.
There exists one winning code for each color. That is, for example, all participants see exactly
the same winning code for Red.
Every envelope additionally contains a lot, which can either be a “win” or a “loss”.
If “win” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for Red on the scrap sheet in front
of you.
If “loss” is written on your lot: Denote the winning code for the other color on the scrap
sheet in front of you.
There is one winning lot in total, which either is in a Red-Blue envelope or in a Red-Green
envelope. It follows that one participant will be asked to report Red, eight or nine participants
will be asked to report Blue, and two or three participants will be asked to report Green.
Figure 1 (on the extra sheet of paper on your desk) presents the lottery graphically: There are
twelve envelopes of which you randomly draw one. Every envelope contains two winning codes.
There are nine envelopes that contain winning codes for Red and Blue. At least eight of these
nine envelopes contain a loss (L) and at most one contains a win (W). The remaining three
envelopes contain winning codes for Red and Green. There are at least two losses and at most
one win contained in these envelopes.
Note that there is exactly one winning lot among the twelve envelopes. That means that if the
win is contained in a Red-Blue envelope, all Red-Green envelopes will contain a loss. Conversely
it also holds that, if the win is contained in a Red-Green envelope, that all Red-Blue envelopes
contain losses. The win is contained with equal probability in one of the twelve envelopes.
Please note the following properties of the lottery:
• 1 participant wins Red, 8 to 9 participants win Blue and 2 to 3 participants win Green.
• Every person sees 2 out of 3 possible winning codes.
• All participants see the winning code for Red.
• No participant who wins Green sees the winning code of Blue.
• No participant who wins Blue sees the winning code of Green.
After all participants denoted their code, we will come with a sealed box into which you can
throw your envelope and lot. We will destroy all envelopes and lots after the experiment. This
procedure ensures that neither the remaining participants, nor the experimenters will find out
which envelope you drew.
Report your winning code thereafter to the computer program. The program will register your
color and you will receive the corresponding euro amount at the end of the experiment.
Before you leave the room to pick up your payout, you will see your payout and reported color
on your screen. We will then ask you to stand up. Thereafter, we will come one after another
to every participant and will ask you to read out loudly the color reported by you.
Take your time to read through the instructions again and make sure that you understood
everything. Please raise your hand if you have questions and we will come to you.
Please press proceed on your screen once you are finished. Your will then answer some control
questions before the lottery begins.
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